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Democratic Change
and Transition in
Africa and the
Dilemma of Nigeria
Leonard Robinson, Jr.
The 1990s witnessed profound political change throughout the continent of Africa.
Tired and frustrated with one-party, autocratic, and often military rule, ordinary
African citizens in country after country began to voice and demonstrate their
discontent in 1990. As the former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe broke
ranks with the Soviet Union to claim their independence, these extraordinary
events served as an added catalyst to African civil servants, market women, taxi
drivers and peri-urban inhabitants to rise up against what they increasingly
viewed as repressive governments and regimes, which had done little or nothing to
improve their living standards and conditions. Almost ten years later, twenty-plus
nations have held democratic elections at least twice; elements of civil society are
evident; government has become more participatory and transparent; freedom of
the press and free speech are evident everywhere; military regimes are becoming a
relic of the past; and economic reforms and real growth are beginning to register a
positive impact on formerly ravaged countries such as Mozambique and Uganda.
There have been difficulties and setbacks in several countries, but overall, the
future looks promising for the world's last frontier.
Nigeria, a complicated, complex, and troubled nation of an estimated 120 mil-
lion people, where the military has ruled for all but ten years of independence,
looms as Africa's most important country in political transition. With the passing
offormer hardline dictator General Sani Abacha and the ascendency of his en-
lightened and reform minded-successor, General Abdusalami Abubakar, Nigerians.
as well as the international community, are somewhat optimistic that this pivotal
nation may finally participate in democratic elections to return the country to
civilian rule.
The destruction of the Berlin wall and the subsequent weakening of Russia's hege-
mony in the Eastern bloc countries had a subtle ripple effect throughout Africa.
Fueled in part by eventual declarations of independence by their satellite countries, an
unthinkable phenomenon at the height of Soviet power, Africans from all walks of life
also began to show signs of unrest and discontent with their long-standing autocratic
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129
Africa
P<#~ '7
Nigeria yr^'^n
-
A
forms of government. In Benin, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Cote d'lvoire, Sao Tome e
Principe, Togo, and Cameroon, demonstrations broke out in protest against declining
economies, scarcity of basic commodities, rising unemployment, nonpayment of sala-
ries for government workers, and of immense importance, against one-party dictatorship
and authoritarian military rule.
The faces of Africa's protestors were varied. Civil servants, taxi drivers, market
women, and ordinary citizens took to the streets to vent their frustrations. Eventually,
the political winds of change spread to other nations, including Mali, Niger, Zambia,
and even to then President Sese Seko's Zaire.
Winds of Change
To be sure, Africans were self-motivated to press for change. Despite years of hollow,
unending promises by incumbent governments to be responsive to basic human needs,
persistent declining living standards and conditions of people, especially among the
rural poor and urban disadvantaged, combined with restrictions on freedom, worked
against old hard-line regimes. Likewise, governments were increasingly viewed as cor-
rupt, repressive, incompetent, and disrespectful of the rule of law as well as refusing to
acknowledge basic human rights.
Events unfolded so rapidly across the continent that one could legitimately charac-
terize the process as a movement. Policymakers in the Department of State were openly,
albeit guardedly, excited about what on the surface appeared to be genuine political
change. During 1990-1991, two developments occurred which contributed to the accel-
eration of the pace and quality of political upheaval. First, at the Francophone summit
at La Boule, the late prime minister of France, Francois Mitterrand, openly admonished
the elder statesmen of the Francophone nations and cajoled them to liberalize their
governments; to allow for greater transparency and accountability. More significantly,
Mitterrand challenged his fellow statesmen to allow for a moreopen democratic politi-
cal process as a way to strengthen the performance of government and, parenthetically,
to stimulate the improvement of overall economic performance. In essence, Mitterrand
sought and demanded political pluralism as a way to foster better, more accountable
government and as a way for France to lessen its economic burden caused by annual
substantial infusions of capital and other forms of assistance to Francophone govern-
ments. Second, the mighty Soviet Union and Communism, its cloak of invincibility
stripped away, collapsed. The Cold War was over. Democracy had triumphed.
The United States was quick to jump on what it perceived as a democracy band-
wagon rolling through the continent. No longer did the Cold War dictate America's
foreign policy posture toward regimes. We openly embraced those countries undergoing
progressive change with diplomatic interventions in support of democracy and with
development assistance increasingly tied to a government's willingness to allow plural-
ism, freedom of the press, democratic elections, and economic policy reform.
A Survey of Specific Cases
In the past eight years we have witnessed some extraordinary variations and develop-
ments in the political landscape of Africa. These dynamics vary from region to region
and from country to country. Liberia is lurching back toward some semblance of nor-
malcy after a bloody and violent seven-year civil war precipitated by the invasion of a
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ragtag rebel patrol that mushroomed over time into a rebel army to overthrow the mili-
tary regime of Samuel Doe. The principal protagonist, Charles Taylor, emerged victori-
ous in an internationally certified, democratic election in August 1997. Benin, one of
the first African countries to experience relatively smooth, nonviolent change, has expe-
rienced two democratic elections with the former military dictator, Mathew Kerrekou,
having scored an upset victory over Benin's first democratically elected incumbent,
Nicephore Soglo. Next door in neighboring Togo, 1990 through 1994 marked an era of
chaos and violence. Would-be candidates were attacked, some were assassinated, others
disappeared. But former military dictator Gnassingbe Eyadema proved resilient.
Through intimidation of the electorate and manipulation of the electoral system, he
remains head of state through two so-called democratic elections. The Cote dTvoire
also experienced violent unrest, widespread demonstrations which frequently involved
clashes with the gendarmerie. Nonetheless, the venerable Houphouet Boigney prevailed
until he died in 1993 of natural causes at age ninety.
In Central Africa, Gabon experienced similar street violence and the intimidation of
political leaders and their party members. But President Bongo maintains his grip on
power. In southern Africa, we witnessed the ouster of a founding father in Zambia with
the rise of Frederick Chiluba at the expense of Kenneth Kaunda. The people of Mali in
the Sahel region paid the supreme sacrifice when scores of their sons and daughters fell
in the face of trigger-happy soldiers. What rose from the ashes, however, was the vision-
ary leadership of Captain Toure, who kept his promise and moved his country through a
skillful, nonviolent transition, to the election of Alpha Konare as head of state. Develop-
ment in Mali today is clearly evident under the enlightened governance of President
Konare. Mozambique, racked by seventeen years of brutal civil war, is on a remarkable
path to economic and social recovery, registering almost 8 percent growth last year. And
in a truly breathtaking development, South Africa's repressive system of apartheid is
dead. Nelson Mandela, imprisoned on Robyn Island for more than twenty-seven years
as the symbol of the anti-apartheid struggle, emerged a free man and enjoys messiahlike
status worldwide as a statesman and as president of the Republic of South Africa.
There are presently more than twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa in various
stages of political transition, primarily in the direction of more democratic and pluralis-
tic societies, where civil society is beginning to play a critical role in motivating and
guiding government in the implementation of democratic values, standards, and prac-
tices. Governments and their leaders are increasingly being held accountable for their
policies and actions. There are some notable examples of political progress and con-
structive economic reform and performance where rates of growth are singled out by
the World Bank as exemplary. These countries include Uganda, Ghana, Benin,
Botswana, and Mozambique.
Retrogression
On the other side of the continuum, however, some countries have experienced set-
backs, if not outright retrogression, in evolving toward open democratic systems of
governance. Democracy isa difficult process, often sloppy, uneven in its application,
and confusing to those unfamiliar with its practice. In the early years of Africa's move-
ment toward political change, policymakers in the U.S. Department of State were often
euphoric, naively so, when an election was held successfully. They soon realized that
the singular act of conducting an election was insufficient to certify the viability of any
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given country's democratization process.
The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, is being ravaged yet again by
armed violence and deadly ethnic confrontation. Barely two years have elapsed since
the hated Joseph Mobutu was driven from power and subsequently died in exile. The
nascent government of Laurent Kabila, the former rebel guerilla who drove Mobutu
from power with the military, financial, and tactical assistance of Rwanda and Uganda,
is under siege, racked with internal disarray and rebellion and the armed insurrection of
hundreds of soldiers from the same neighboring countries that marched triumphantly
into Kinshasa with Kabila. In central Africa the rebel army uprising has precipitated an
ominous situation exacerbated by the entry of troops from Zimbabwe, Chad, and
Angola in support of Kabila and by soldiers from Uganda and Rwanda in support of the
rebels. Unparalleled in modern Africa history, the present state of play in central Africa,
if not resolved decisively, could produce a conflagration of catastrophic proportions.
In Angola, the fragile peace accord negotiated by the United Nations in 1 992 and
monitored by UN peacekeeping forces has been shattered in recent months. In early
December, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that in Angola "there is a war." The
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) leader and strongman,
Dr. Jonas Savimbi, never really accepted the results of the 1992 presidential election,
which, though internationally certified, confirmed President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos
and his Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government as the
victorious political party. Attempts to form a government of national unity have failed
repeatedly. Efforts to completely demobilize and demilitarize fighters initially regis-
tered some limited success, but in recent years UNITA has been able to rearm, clearly
in preparation for return to war. Just as significant, the MPLA government has encoun-
tered continual resistance in trying to stabilize the lucrative diamond-mining operations
throughout territory persistently challenged and often controlled by UNITA. The mining
and marketing of diamonds, despite international trade embargoes against UNITA, has
enabled them to finance their operations. Angola's twenty-three-year civil war has dev-
astated the country and crippled a generation of young children, victims of forced mili-
tary engagement, their limbs blown away by thousands of hidden, deadly land mines.
The Horn of Africa is no exception either; Eritrea and Ethiopia are locked in a raging
border dispute that has caused significant casualties on both sides, including the indis-
criminate bombing of schools and hospitals. Not only has this renewed conflict brought
an abrupt halt to the evolution of internal constructive political change, but the resultant
instability has had an adverse effect on economic development in both countries.
The Realities of Democratic Transition
These case accounts illustrate graphically the fragility of democratic political change in
parts of Africa today. Indeed, democracy does not occur at the flick of a switch or as a
consequence of who emerges victorious from the ballot box. It takes decades, genera-
tions, to evolve. Consider the experience of the United States as an example, which is
certainly the world's longest practicing democracy, but far from being perfect in its
application. Or examine the centuries it has taken for Europe to seriously consider the
issue of "unity." The process of democratization is also often accompanied by violence.
Witness American history, especially the Civil War and the civil rights movement.
In the case of Africa, I believe it is probable that the transition to democracy will
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continue to be uneven and fraught with periods of great difficulty, perhaps even very
violent upheavals.
There are a number of factors African leaders, including those representing civil
society, must recognize, grapple with, and resolve in order to move forward effectively
in the process of democratization.
• Generations of old-line leaders and those under their tutelage, thus
exposed to their methods of governance, must depart from the political
landscape.
• The concept of "winner take all" is very Western and basically anath-
ema to the African way. Thus, politicians and political parties should be
encouraged to form governments of nationalunity to foster cooperation
in the exercise of good, effective governance for the welfare of the
nation.
• Opposition leaders and members of their parties must learn the art of
finesse, compromise, and give-and-take. Loyal oppositions must emerge
and even consent to ministerial-level positions in governments of
national unity.
• Heads of state and prime ministers, especially those selected from
opposition parties, must, in a parliamentary arrangement, learn how to
work together and to cooperate for the general well-being of the nation
and for effective, productive government.
• Independent judiciary systems must be established, protected, and
permitted to function without any outside influence.
• Senior government officials must have vision and a true commitment to
the welfare of their people and for the prosperity of the nation.
• Military institutions must learn to protect and defend democracy,
especially democratic principles and practices, through the application
and practice of traditional military roles in a free and open society.
• The press and other media must be absolutely free, but also responsible
in their monitoring role of open, accountable, and transparent govern-
ment.
• Basic human rights must be respected and protected.
• The rule of law must prevail and serve to ensure citizens of due process
and protection under the law.
• Civil society must expand and be effective in promoting the incorpora-
tion of democratic values, principles, and practices in governance and
society in general.
The eventual incorporation of principles of democracy into the basic fabric of Afri-
can societies may occur with some degree of familiarity and ease in those countries
where, prior to the colonial era, there were in traditional villages and among ethnic
societies elements of participation, accountability, and transparency. Ghana is a case in
point where paramount chiefs presided over a council of sub-chiefs and village elders
for the purpose of discussing and rendering decisions pertinent to the conduct and man-
agement of community affairs. In no instancedid the paramount chief exercise absolute
authority or power, nor could he, for in the practice of "their form of democracy," all
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decisions were reached by consensus. Numerous African societies conducted the affairs
of the community in similar fashion before the imposition of colonial rule.
The British, French, and others, especially the Portuguese and Belgians, of course,
displaced African traditional systems of governance with methods of their own; totally
alien structures and practices which to this day reverberate loudly and adversely in the
aftermath of post-colonial independence.
Summation
It will take time and generations for Africa to fully adapt and institutionalize demo-
cratic practices into its mainstream. It will require patience and understanding as well
as assistance on the part of the West to facilitate the process, as is appropriate. It is
equally important that we respect their own historical, cultural, ethnic, and territorial
realities as African nations struggle with a wealth of economic, social, and political
pressures and aspirations. Those who constantly refer to the continent as a "hopeless
basket case," especially the Western media, should refrain from applying Western stan-
dards and experience to the realities of extant conditions in Africa. Such skeptics should
also remember the history of America and of Europe and the rocky roads they encoun-
tered and continue to experience in the pursuit of "government for and by the people."
Africa is a continent of fifty-four distinct countries. It should be examined within that
context and not labeled in its entirety because of the actions and conditions in six or
eight countries. Asia, Europe, and Latin America are not stigmatized by the actions,
many of them horrific in nature, of several countries. Africa should be accorded the
exact same treatment.
The United States should also refrain from any attempt to dictate to sovereign na-
tions what the quality and pace of their democratization process should be. We do,
however, have a moral obligation to speak out against those governments suspected of
gross human rights violations. Our country is the nation with the most experience in the
practice of democracy, and it is in our best interest to stand up for democracy and
democratic principles in an appropriate context.
Whither Nigeria!
The dilemma of Nigeria hangs over Africa like a huge menacing cloud of locusts. One
in every four or five Africans is of Nigerian origin. With an estimated population in
excess of 1 15 million people, it is a country whose influence and impact is felt in prac-
tically every region of the continent.
Nigeria is a country of immense quantities of natural resources. Its oil reserves are
astounding. As a people, Nigerians are exceptionally energetic, intelligent, enterprising,
and downright aggressive. Yet despite these positive attributes, Nigeria will and often
does break one's heart. So much wasted potential; so many talented people unable to
channel their gifts into productive pursuits; so much energy, dynamism, and creativity;
so well endowed with precious resources. But to what end?
The country should be, could be, the Brazil of Africa, or the Korea of Africa. But in
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reality and in general, Nigerians are not held in high esteem by the international com-
munity. Persistent, inept, and abusive military rule lies at the heart of the country's
tainted image. The nation is also vilified because of highly visible Nigerians who traffic
in narcotics throughout the world and for their blatant attempts to defraud businesses,
banks, and individuals through what is referred to as "advance fee fraud" or 419 finan-
cial crimes. Corruption in government is rampant, if not endemic, and in the absence of
any semblance of democracy in the past decade, the protection of basic human rights is
nonexistent.
Most of Nigeria's leaders, both military and civilian, have lacked vision, commit-
ment to and compassion for the people, and a sense of accountability and respect for the
rule of law. Far more disturbing has been the apparent inability of its leaders to recog-
nize and accept Nigeria's special role and awesome potential as a model for Africa
because of the enormity of human resources as well as natural treasures. Instead, most
leaders have been consumed with greed, power, and corruption.
Political change has been difficult, if not impossible, in Nigeria. A succession of
military rulers have promised, ad nauseam, democratic civilian rule, only to break such
promises time and time again. General Sani Abacha, who replaced General Ibrahima
Babangida after the annulled presidential election in June 1993, took the country
through a painful, time-consuming, and costlycharade designed to formulate a new
constitution. After more than two years of intense and often contentious deliberation, a
draft constitution was produced, but it was never accepted by Abacha and the Provi-
sional Ruling Council (PRC). At the beginning of 1998, Abacha and his henchmen
started a campaign to strong-arm the few political parties allowed in the country to
endorse him as the sole presidential candidate for elections that would have been held
later in the year. But fate intervened.
June 1998 was a pivotal month in the history of Nigeria. Within a period of thirty
days, the political landscape of Nigeria shifted dramatically. On June 8, Sani Abacha
died of an alleged heart attack. During a meeting with U.S. undersecretary of state Tom
Pickering on July 7, Mashood Abiola, the jailed and presumed winner of the 1993 presi-
dential election, was stricken and died of cardiac arrest. The extraordinary confluence
of these two events has produced yet another military officer to manage the affairs of
state and of government, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. There are definitive indica-
tions, however, that he is a soldier with a difference.
To provide some contextual basis for the narrative to follow, one must digress for a
moment to reflect on years of military rule in Nigeria. Since independence was gained
some thirty-eight years ago, the people of this vast and ethnically complex country have
experienced only twelve years of civilian rule. Given this reality, I have long held the
view that Nigeria's military, so entrenched in the administration of government, cannot
simply walk away from the inherent lucrative perks of power, return to the barracks,
and remain there in a stable, nonthreatening posture to a civilian-led regime. Such a
departure is too abrupt and bound to fail in a country where military rule has essentially
become institutionalized.
Nigeria's military, therefore, must be weaned from power, enticed away from the
perks and trappings of power over time, in order for any democratically elected civilian
government to gain sufficient confidence that the rank-and-file sergeants, captains, and
colonels will permit them to govern without interference or to overthrow them through
the execution of a coup d'etat.
During his 1985-1993 reign, General Ibrahima Babangida imposed a two-party sys-
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tcm in an attempt, among other things, to overcome Nigeria's deep tribal and ethnic
cleavages. Those eligible to vote were actively encouraged to join cither the Republican
or Democratic party and to campaign vigorously for the candidate of their choice.
Washington policymakers in theDepartment of State and the National Security Council
were convinced, in 1990-1992, that Babangida would live up to his promise to hold
elections in 1993 and to stand by the results. As history has recorded, however, it was
not to be, for the military-controlled government aborted the presidential election pro-
cess and declared the results of the presumptive winner, Mashood Abiola, null and void.
An analysis of the circumstances that led to this action on the part of Babangida's
government, one facilitated by privileged information available to me, suggests that
officers in Babangida's inner circle, including his then chief of the military and minister
of defense, Sani Abacha, thwarted any move on his part to officially accept the voting
results, most likely on pain of death. Babangida did not object or resist. In effect, it
appears clear that Babangida's desire to live was greater than his commitment to de-
mocracy for the people of Nigeria.
With the unexpected demise of General Abacha, General Abubakar, a compromise
choice for the PRC, has been elevated to head of state. Abubakar has accomplished
some rather amazing things. In a statement on July 20, he officially announced an elec-
tion timetable and set the official date for the return to civilian rule. The timeline has
been clearly established and is being implemented as documented through the success-
ful conduct of local government elections on December 5. Those elections were interna-
tionally certified by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the
Carter Center, which visited Nigeria from November 30 through December 8, 1998.
Subsequent elections scheduled are January 9, 1999 (State Assembly and governors),
February 20 (National Assembly), and February 27 for presidential elections.
Abubakar has also confounded political pundits in Africa by quietly but effectively
launching an anticorruption and fraud campaign. Large sums of federal money, illegally
allocated by members of Abacha's family and circle of close advisers, have been re-
turned on demand. Abubakar has also shown understanding, diplomacy, and restraint in
dealing with many of the country's nagging minority problems, especially among the
Ijaws, Igonis, and Owaris. Most of Nigeria's oil is extracted in their regions, yet little if
any of the official revenue derived from this resource is allocated for the benefit of their
communities. The level of violence and unrest, particularly in the Owari area, caused a
20 percent reduction in oil production and refining.
More important, given Nigeria's entrenched military history of governance, it is
reliablyreported that General Abubakar has been to the barracks to talk to the troops and
to his officers. Promises have been made and perks offered to gain their commitment to
the projected handover to a democratically elected government. Increased and better
pay for the rank and file and officers has been promised. Cars for officers and improved
and subsidized housing have also, reportedly, been offered, as well as military training
opportunities in the United Kingdom and, it is hoped, the United States. Despite these
moves by Abubakar, described by many as deft and cunning, the big question remains
— Is the military really listening and are they committed to returning to the barracks
and transform themselves into a more traditionally functioning army designed to protect
and defend the nation and its forms and systems of government and the integrity of its
borders. Observers in the recent local government elections point to the emergence of
the People's Democratic Party and its front-running presidential candidate, former gen-
eral and head of state Olusegun Obasanjo, as a barometer of current thinking in the
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barracks. His party won control of more than 50 percent of the councils in the country
in the December 5 election contested by nine political parties. Officers in the military
and among the rank and file reason, apparently, that if General Obasanjo wins the presi-
dential election on February 27 as is widely predicted, he, as a former military officer,
will continue to deliver the perks and allowances initiated by Abubakar. Will this dy-
namic ensure the success of Nigeria's return to democratic civilian rule? Only time will
tell.
It is for certain that Nigeria and its allegedly interim leadership cannot be ignored.
The ability to move decisively is both a function of Abubakar's own political skills and
courage of conviction, but a major shift in attitude and strategy by the PRC. This latter
point is all the more remarkable when one factors in the revelation that the composition
of the PRC has not changed appreciably since Abacha's reign. One must reasonably
conclude, then, that the PRC had become aware of Nigeria's growing worldwide reputa-
tion as a lawless, corrupt, drug-trafficking, and out-of-control state. In fact, the image of
a "pariah state" was beginning to gain currency and reverberate throughout the interna-
tional community. This reality, combined with growing internal unrest and palpable
discontent, probably contributed to the selection of Abubakar to guide the country
through its most important transition in modern history.
According to all accounts, the general is a soldier's soldier and a man of principle
andvision. He is deeply committed to the objective of reinstilling a sense of military
duty and pride in the military system and returning the military to its traditional role in
society. He does not want to be associated with a military replete with bureaucrats. His
power base and ability to command, thus far, appears to be tied to the following factors:
• Recognized expertise as a military professional
• Offer of significant allowances and benefits to officers and rank-and-file
soldiers
• A 650 percent increase in wages for federal civil servants
• Election timetable adopted and being implemented
• Cautious but deliberate moves to curb corruption
• Deft moves against his detractors and enemies
• Sensitive and diplomatic management of issues surrounding ethnic
minority communities
• A man of his word
Mrs. Abubakar, Nigeria's first lady, is a high court justice. There is widespread
speculation that she has had a profound, positive impact on the general, especially his
apparent respect for the rule of law and for an independent judicial system.
Could it be that Abubakar represents the character and quality of leadership Nigeri-
ans deserve and have been hoping for for decades? Is he a leader who can be trusted to
keep his word after countless broken and dashed promises? Can Abubakar hold on to
command and control long enough and effectively enough to persuade the troops to
remain in the barracks and to adhere to the commitment to protect and defend the terri-
torial integrity of the nation?
No matter what form of government is in charge of the affairs of state, its leaders
will immediately be confronted by a wave of daunting economic and social problems.
Though Nigeria is swimming in oil, its refineries are in ill repair and do not produce
enough to supply internal requirements. The country's infrastructure, in general, has
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been woefully neglected. Social problems that have precipitated unrest throughout the
country require urgent attention andresolution. The general condition of Nigeria's
people is declining rapidly. Political stability is essential to attacking and solving the
ills of Nigeria.
In Washington's Foggy Bottom, policymakers are openly excited about what they see
happening in Nigeria as a consequence of Abubakar's leadership. Many of them, includ-
ing the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Susan Rice, are optimistic about
Nigeria's most recent attempt to implement a democratically elected civilian govern-
ment.
I remain somewhat skeptical to guardedly optimistic. After all, I have been down this
road before and am apprehensive about having my heart broken yet again, ^p
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